The Gale-Shapley (men-proposing) stable matching algorithm (1962) has been shown by Dubins and Freedman (1981) to be strategy proof for each man. In recent years, this algorithm has been used extensively across many real-life matching markets, such as matching students to schools in many cities across the world. Interestingly, despite applicants being advised that it is in their best interest to state their true preferences, there is evidence to suggest that a significant amount of applicants are nonetheless attempting to strategically misreport their preferences (Hassidim et al., 2015) . In this note, we show that while strategy proof for each man, no algorithm implementing the men-optimal stable matching mechanism is "obviously strategy proof" for the men -a term recently defined by Li (2015) -showing that indeed to be convinced that no strategic opportunities exist for any man, regardless of whether this mechanism is described using the Gale-Shapley algorithm or in any other way, requires significant cognitive effort, and contingent reasoning.
Definition 4 (Strategy Proofness). A matching mechanism C is said to be strategy proof if for every preference profilep = (p m ) m∈M ∈ P(W ) M , for every agent m ∈ M and for every alternative preference list p m ∈ P(W ), it is the case that C m (p) m C m (p m ,p −m ) according to p m , where (p m ,p −m ) denotes that preference profile obtained fromp by setting the preferences of m to be p m . In other words, m would not be better off misrepresenting his preference list to be p m .
Obvious Strategy Proofness
In this section, we briefly describe machinery recently developed in great generality by Li (2015) , which we heavily rephrase for the special case of deterministic matching mechanisms with finite preference and outcomes sets. For ease of presentation, we furthermore focus on mechanism implementations with complete information. We emphasize that the results of this note, and their proofs, still hold (mutatis mutandis) for the general definitions of Li (2015) .
Definition 5 (Extensive-Form Mechanism Implementation). An extensive-form mechanism implementation for M over W consists of:
1. A rooted tree T .
A map X : L(T ) → M(M, W
) from the leaves of T to matchings between M and W .
A map
, from edges of T to predicates over P(W ), s.t. both of the following hold:
• The predicates corresponding to edges outgoing from the same node are disjoint.
• The disjunction (i.e., set union) of all predicates corresponding to edges outgoing from a node n equals the predicate corresponding to the last edge outgoing from a node labeled Q(n) along the path from the root to n, or to the predicate matching all elements of P(W ) if no such edge exists.
Definition 6 (Pass Through). We say that a preference profilep ∈ P(W ) M passes through a node n ∈ V (T ) if for each edge e along the path from the root to n, it is the case that p Q(n ) ∈ A(e), where n is the source node of e.
Definition 7 (Implemented Mechanism). Given an extensive-form mechanism implementation I, we denote by C I , called the mechanism implemented by I, the matching mechanism mapping a preference profilep ∈ P(W ) M to the matching X(n), where n is the unique leaf through whichp passes. Equivalently, n is the node in T obtained by traversing T from its root, and from each node n , following the edge outgoing from n whose predicate matches the preference list of Q(n ).
Definition 8 (Divergence). We say that p, p ∈ P(W ) diverge at a node n ∈ V (T ) if there exist two distinct edges e, e outgoing from n s.t p ∈ A(e) and p ∈ A(e ).
Definition 9 (Obvious Strategy Proofness). An extensive-form mechanism implementation I is said to be obviously strategy proof (OSP) if for everyp = (p m ) m∈M ∈ P(W ) M andp = (p m ) m∈M ∈ P(W ) M , for every m ∈ M and for every node n with Q(n) = m through which bothp andp pass and in which p m and p m diverge, it is the case that Li (2015) shows that obviously-strategy-proof mechanism implementations are, in a precise sense, mechanism implementations that can be shown to implement strategy-proof mechanisms under a cognitively limited model that does not allow for contingent reasoning.
Remark 1. To observe that strategy proofness of C I indeed is a weaker condition than obvious strategy proofness of I, note that C I is strategy proof iff for everyp = (p m ) m∈M ∈ P(W ) M , for every m ∈ M , for everyp m ∈ P(W ), and for every node n with Q(n) = m through whichp passes and in which p m and p m diverge, 1 it is the case that
Definition 10 (OSP Implementability). A matching mechanism C : P(W ) M → M(M, W ) is said to be OSP implementable if C = C I for some obviously strategy proof implementation I.
In this case, we say that I OSP-implements C.
The Stable Matching Problem
Gale and Shapley (1962) consider a matching problem with two-sided preferences; they think of M as a set of men, and of W as a set of women. We consider a simplified version of their model.
Definition 11 (Preferences for W over M ). We define preference lists over M and preference profiles for W over M analogously to Definition 1.
is said to be unstable w.r.t.p andq if there exist m ∈ M and w ∈ W , each preferring the other over the partner matched to them by µ. If µ is not unstable, then it is said to be stable.
Theorem 1 (Gale and Shapley (1962) ). A stable matching between M and W always exists for every pair of preference profilesp ∈ P(W ) M andq ∈ P(M ) W . Moreover, there exists an M -optimal stable matching, i.e., a stable matching where each man weakly prefers his match in this stable matching over his match in any other stable matching.
Definition 13 (Cq). For a preference profileq ∈ P(M ) W for W over M , we denote by Cq : P(W ) M → M(M, W ) the (single-sided) matching mechanism mapping each preference profilē p ∈ P(W ) M for M over W to the M -optimal stable matching w.r.t.p andq. Dubins and Freedman (1981) have shown that Gale and Shapley's algorithm for finding the M -optimal stable matching is strategy proof for each man m ∈ M (and in fact weakly group strategy proof for the men). We now rephrase their result in the notation of this note.
Theorem 2 (Dubins and Freedman (1981) ). Cq is strategy proof for every preference profilē q ∈ P(M ) W for W over M .
In this note, we focus on the question of whether Cq is not only strategy proof, as Dubins and Freedman have shown, but also OSP implementable.
Example 1 (Cq is OSP Implementable when Women's Preferences are Perfectly Aligned). Let q ∈ P(M ) and letq = (q) w∈W be the preference profile in which all women share the same preference list q. Cq is OSP implementable by the following "serial-dictatorship" mechanism: ask the man most preferred according toq which woman he prefers most, and assign that woman to this man (in all leaves of the subtree corresponding to this response), ask the man secondmost preferred according toq which woman he prefers most out of those not yet assigned to any man, and assign that woman to this man (in all leaves of the subtree corresponding to this response), etc. The proof that this implementation is OSP is similar to the proof of Li (2015) that random serial dictatorship (where the order of the dictatorship is determined uniformly at random rather than using an externally given orderq) is OSP.
Another noteworthy example is that of arbitrary preferences in a very small matching market. Examples 1 and 2 can be generalized together for acyclical preferences, a preference-profile structure first defined by Ergin (2002) . Definition 14 (Acyclicality). A preference profileq ∈ P(M ) W for W over M is said to be cyclical if there exist a, b, c ∈ M and x, y ∈ W s.t. a x b x c y a. Ifq is not cyclical, then it is said to be acyclical. Ergin (2002) shows that acyclicality ofq is necessary and sufficient for Cq to be group strategy proof (and not only weakly group strategy proof) and Pareto efficient. When a preference profileq satisfies this condition (as do the preference profiles in Examples 1 and 2), we can show that Cq is OSP implementable.
Theorem 3. Cq is OSP implementable for every acyclical preference profileq ∈ P(M ) W for W over M .
Proof sketch. We prove the result by induction over |M | = |W |. By acyclicality, at most two men are ranked by some woman as her top choice. If only one such man m ∈ M exists, then he is ranked by all women as their top choice -in this case, we ask this man for his top choice w ∈ W , assign her to him, and then continue by induction (finding in an OSP manner the men-optimal stable matching between M \ {m} and W \ {w}). Otherwise, there are precisely two men a ∈ M and b ∈ M who are ranked by some woman as her top choice. By acyclicality, each woman either has a as her top choice and b as her second-best choice, or vice versa. For each woman w ∈ W that prefers a most, we ask a whether he prefers w most; if so, we assign w to a and continue by induction. Otherwise, for each woman w ∈ W that prefers b most, as ask b whether he prefers b most; if so, we assign w to b and continue by induction. Otherwise, we ask each of a and b for his top choice, assign each of them his top choice, and continue by induction.
We do note, however, that acyclicality ofq is not a necessary condition for OSP implementability of Cq, as demonstrated by the following example.
Example 3 (OSP-Implementable Cq with Cyclicalq). Let W = {x, y, z} and M = {a, b, c}. We claim that Cq, for the following cyclical preference profileq, is OSP implementable:
We begin by noting thatq is indeed cyclical, as a y c y b z a. We now note that the following mechanism OSP-implements Cq:
1. Ask a whether he prefers x the most; if so, assign x to a and continue as in Example 2 (finding in an OSP manner the men-optimal stable matching between {y, z} and {b, c}).
2. Ask a whether he prefers y the most; if so, assign y to a and continue as in Example 2.
(Otherwise, we deduce that 1) a prefers z the most and therefore 2) c will not end up being matched to z.)
3. Ask b whether he prefers z the most; if so, assign z to b and continue as in Example 2.
4. Ask b whether he prefers x the most; if so, assign x to b, z to a, and y to c. (Otherwise, we deduce that b prefers y the most.)
5. Ask c whether he prefers x over y. If so, assign x to c, y to b, and z to a. (Otherwise, we deduce that b will not end up being matched to y.)
6. Ask b whether he prefers z over x. Assign b to his most-preferred choice between z and x and continue as in Example 2.
Nonetheless, as we show in the next section, when |W | > 2 and women's preferences are sufficiently unaligned, Cq is not OSP implementable.
Impossibility Result for General Preferences
We now phrase our main impossibility result. a. If |W | > 2, there exists a preference profileq ∈ P(M ) W , s.t. Cq is not OSP implementable.
b. As |W | grows, with high probability Cq is not OSP implementable, whereq ∼ U P(M ) W .
Before proving Theorem 4, we first prove a special case of Theorem 4(a), which cleanly demonstrates the construction underlying our proof of both parts of Theorem 4. Lemma 1. For |W | = 3, there exists a preference profileq ∈ P(M ) W s.t. Cq is not OSP implementable.
Proof. Let W = {x, y, z} and M = {a, c, b}. Letq be the following preference profile:
Assume for contradiction that an OSP implementation I for Cq exists. We define: (2015), we note that if we "prune" the tree of I by replacing, for each edge e, the predicate A(e) with the conjunction (i.e., set intersection) of A(e) with the predicate matching all elements of P Q(n) , where n is the source node of e, and by consequently deleting all edges e for which A(e) = ⊥, we obtain, in a precise sense, an OSP implementation of Cq where the preference list of each agent m ∈ M is a priori restricted to be in P m . See Appendix A for the precise definition of implementation and OSP when the domain of preferences is restricted.
Let n be the earliest (i.e., closest to the root) node in the pruned tree that has more than one outgoing edge (such a node clearly exists, since Cq is not constant over P a × P b × P c ). By symmetry ofq, P a , P b , P c , w.l.o.g. Q(n) = a. By definition of pruning, it must be the case that n has two outgoing edges, one labeled p 1 a , and the other -p 2 a . We claim that the mechanism of the pruned tree is in fact not OSP. Indeed, for p a = p 2 a (the "true preferences"), p b = p 2 b , and p c = p 1 c , we have that C I a (p) = Cq a (p) = x, yet for p a = p 1 a (a "possible manipulation"), p b = p 1 b , and p c = p 2 c , we have that C I a (p ) = Cq a (p ) = y, even though C I a (p ) = y a x = C I a (p) according to p a (by definition of n, bothp andp pass through n, and p a and p b diverge at n), and so the mechanism of the pruned tree indeed is not OSP -a contradiction.
Proof sketch of Theorem 4. Part a follows from the proof of Lemma 1. Indeed, for |M | = |W | > 2, we can choose three distinct men a, b, c and three distinct women x, y, z whose preferences will be set as in Lemma 1 (with all men in M \ {a, b, c} less preferred by x, y, and z than a, b, and c), and pair up all other men and women into pairs (m, w) where we set the preference list of w to be m followed by all other men arbitrarily (and in the pruning in the proof, set only one possible preference list for m, which favors w the most).
Part b also follows from the proof of Lemma 1. Indeed, if there exist a, b, c ∈ M and x, y, z ∈ W s.t. all parts of Eq. (1) hold, then by a similar argument (setting a, b, c to prefer each of x, y, z over all women in W \{x, y, z}, and pairing up all other men and women into pairs (m, w) where we set the preference list of m to prefer w the most),q is not OSP implementable.
